Pass-through of CO2 Emission Costs to Hourly Electricity Prices in Germany by Hintermann, Beat
Pass-through of CO2 emission costs to hourly
electricity prices in Germany
Author: Beat Hintermann
University of Basel, Faculty of Business and Economics
Peter Merian-Weg 6
4002 Basel, Switzerland
b.hintermann@unibas.ch
Tel: +41 61 267 3339; Fax: +41 61 267 3340
1
Abstract
I estimate the level of emissions cost pass-through to hourly wholesale electricity prices
in Germany, based on spot market data. I control for contemporaneous shocks to demand
and supply by constructing a detailed supply curve for fossil generation, and intersecting it
with residual demand for fossil-based electricity for every hour. Determining the marginal
generator allows me to use marginal fuel and allowance costs (rather than prices) as
explanatory variables in order to identify the level of cost pass-through directly and with
a high level of precision. I find that allowance costs are passed through to electricity prices
completely (or nearly completely) on average, but that the degree of pass-through varies
over the load curve. My results suggest that there is no economic reason for free allowance
allocation to the German electricity sector, and thus support the updated allocation rules
in Phase 3 of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme.
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1 Introduction
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the largest emissions trading
system to date, with an emissions cap of around 2 billion tons of CO2 per year that includes
emissions from the most energy-intensive industrial sectors and accounts for around 40 %
of the EU’s total CO2 emissions. The fiscal impact of this type of climate legislation resides
with the firms that have to surrender allowances to cover their emissions, net of any free al-
lowances they receive from their governments. Assessing the incidence is more complicated.
Emission allowances are a necessary input for production that generates CO2 emissions as
a by-product, and we would therefore expect the EU allowance (EUA) price to be reflected
in product prices, just like the price of any other input, and independent of the method of
allowance allocation.
The current market value of the aggregate emissions cap is around 12 billion euro per
year; at its peak in early 2006, it exceeded 60 billion euro, corresponding to around 0.6 %
of the EU’s GDP.1 From a public finance point of view, EU governments should secure this
economic rent by selling all allowances and using the revenue to lower existing distortionary
taxes (Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996). But this has not been done. During the first two
market phases (2005-2007 and 2008-2012), almost the entire cap was allocated to firms
free of charge. In the current third market phase (2013-2020), electricity generators in the
EU-15 no longer receive a free allocation of allowances. However, about half of the total
cap continues to be given away for free, to firms in exposed sectors as well as to electricity
generators located in the more recent EU members.2 Therefore, the economic costs of the
EU ETS was, and to a large extent still is, borne by taxpayers that do not receive the full
tax rebate, and due to the tax-interaction effect, the total burden is inefficiently high (Parry,
1995). Considering the size of the program, an appraisal of its incidence is highly policy-
relevant, also in the light of other emission permit markets that have been (or will be) set up
elsewhere. In the current paper, I show that the incidence of the EU’s carbon policy largely
falls on consumers.
1The emissions cap for stationary sources is reduced by 1.74 % of the average cap in phase 2 every year,
which corresponds to an annual reduction by 38.2 million tCO2, implying that the EUA price will likely increase
again over time. Currently, there is a debate in the EU about increasing the rate at which the cap is "melted" in
order to reach the climate goals set for 2050.
2Ellerman et al. (2016) provide a review of the first two phases of the EU ETS; for a detailed description of
the changes in the method and extent of free allocation between phase 2 and phase 3, see Sartor et al. (2015).
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There has been a lengthy policy debate about the merits of free allowance allocation to
the industries included by the EU ETS, and a series of economic papers discuss this issue
from various perspectives (Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006; Hepburn et al., 2006; Neuhoff et al.,
2006). The "industry-friendly" argument claims that in order to avoid carbon leakage via
a relocation of production activities to non-EU countries, and to maintain the international
competitiveness of EU firms, the latter had to be allocated a significant share of emission
allowances for free. This argument hinges on incomplete pass-through: If firms absorb a
part of the allowance cost by lowering their profit margin, then (some) free allocation may
be justified due to carbon leakage and protectionist arguments. If, on the other hand, firms
fully pass on their allowance costs to consumers, free allocation simply constitutes a transfer
from taxpayers to firms without ancillary benefits in the form of protecting domestic jobs or
avoiding leakage.3
In this paper, I estimate the degree of allowance cost pass-through to hourly wholesale
electricity prices in Germany. A number of earlier papers have estimated the degree of al-
lowance cost pass-through to consumer prices, most of them focusing on electricity markets.4
Sijm et al. (2006) report positive rates of cost pass-through using OLS regressions on elec-
tricity spreads for 2005, based on daily future prices, in the order of 60–117 % for Germany,
and of 64–81 % for the Netherlands. Sijm et al. (2008) extend this analysis and find posi-
tive but incomplete allowance cost pass-through for Germany, France, the Netherlands and
Sweden, and (possibly) full pass-through for the United Kingdom. Other papers measuring
allowance cost pass-through based on price or spread regressions include Chernyavs’ ka and
Gulli (2008) and Honkatukia et al. (2013). However, regressing electricity prices on input
prices can lead to biased estimates if the heat rate and the emission intensity of the marginal
generator are correlated with fuel and allowance prices. If the merit order is sensitive to
prices, such a correlation would be expected. To avoid this problem, I regress electricity
prices on marginal input costs, rather than input prices.
3Whereas it is clear that no free allocation is needed if firms pass on all their allowance costs, the reverse
argument is not obvious. Even if firms only pass on a part of their allowance costs by reducing their profit mar-
gin, the very existence of this margin implies some economic rents e.g. from imperfect competition, which the
government may or may not want to protect. From a political economy point of view, incomplete pass-through
requires some free allocation in order to avoid firms’ opposition to the introduction of climate regulation.
4An exception is the analysis by Smale et al. (2006) who focus on the other sectors included in the EU ETS
and find pass-through rates that are lower than for the electricity market, and which depend on an industry’s
exposure to competition from outside the EU.
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Another strand of the literature has focused on the long-term relationship between elec-
tricity, fuel and allowance prices using a cointegration framework, based on the concern that
these prices may be determined jointly in the long run (Fell, 2010; Fell et al., 2015; Fezzi
and Bunn, 2010; Lo Prete and Norman, 2013; Zachmann and von Hirschhausen, 2008). The
consensus is that prices for inputs and electricity share a common trend. In these models,
the effect of a change in an input price on the electricity price has to be computed using
impulse-response functions, which tend to be sensitive to the inclusion of additional control
variables or lags in the underlying model, and also to have large confidence intervals. Also,
the cointegration models mentioned above all rely on futures data. This makes the analy-
sis independent of contemporaneous shocks to the demand and supply of electricity, but the
downside is that in suppressing such shocks, models based on futures data lose a source of
variation that is very useful in identifying the level of cost pass-through.
My paper is most closely related to that by Fabra and Reguant (2014), who measure
the pass-through of emissions costs in the Spanish electricity market based on disaggregated
bidding data. Using data from the first 14 months of the EU ETS, they find that firms pass on
emissions costs fully during peak hours, but not during offpeak hours, with point estimates of
around 110% and 60%, respectively.5 They furthermore show that Spanish electricity prices
include a markup, but that this markup does not respond to cost shocks as a consequence of
inelastic demand and a high correlation of cost shocks across firms.
Because individual bid data is not publicly available for the German electricity market, I
build a detailed hourly dispatch model for electricity by relying on publicly available infor-
mation about generation capacity, and about electricity demand and supply including gen-
eration by "must-run" sources such as renewable and nuclear energy, similar to an approach
by Borenstein et al. (2002). This model allows me to identify the marginal generating unit
(MGU) and compute its allowance and fuel costs, which I then use to estimate the level of cost
pass-through. I find that allowance costs are passed through completely, or near completely,
to wholesale electricity prices overall, with the confidence interval for the base model over all
hours ranging from 81 % to 111 %. This suggests that a free allocation of emissions permits is
simply a gift to firms, as they are already reimbursed for their emissions costs by consumers,
5The point estimates and confidence intervals vary across their different models (Table 2 on p. 2884). The
first four models indicate a cost pass-through of 70% – 140% during peak hours, and of 28% – 97% during
offpeak hours.
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and it supports the EU’s policy change to zero free allocation to electricity producers in the
EU-15 countries.
When I allow pass-through to differ across hours, I find that allowance costs are passed
through more (less) than completely during periods of high (low) demand. In contrast, fuel
costs are passed through more evenly, which leads to differential cost pass-through that is
statistically significant. This result is robust to the model specification, and also consistent
with the results of Fabra and Reguant (2014), who find that Spanish firms do not pass on fuel
costs to the same degree as allowance costs. A possible reason is that due to the presence of
transactions costs and long-term contracts for fuels, the spot prices do not perfectly represent
firms’ opportunity costs related to fuel use. In contrast, emission allowances can be bought
and sold at very low transaction costs. The heterogeneity of cost pass-through across hours
and input types implies that electricity prices do not, or not always, reflect marginal produc-
tion costs; however, it has no implication for the incidence of carbon policy, because costs are
passed on fully on average.
The next section defines the concept of cost pass-through and introduces the empirical
model. Section 3 discusses the market environment and presents the data, along with the
computation of marginal input costs. Section 4 contains the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Estimation of cost pass-through
In this section, I define cost pass-through in the electricity market and present the empirical
model to estimate it.
2.1 Cost pass-through in electricity markets
Let P refer to the electricity price, and MC refer to the marginal cost of producing another
Megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity. The extent to which a change marginal costs is trans-
ferred into a change in the electricity price depends on the degree of competition and on the
price responsiveness of demand and supply.
Figure 1 illustrate cost pass-through for different market structures. Panel (a) shows the
case of perfect competition and linear inverse demand and supply (=marginal cost) curves.
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The initial equilibrium is at (Q0, P0). If the price of allowances or fuel increases, the marginal
cost of generation increases by ∆MC. Due to the demand response, the output price in-
creases by ∆P ≤ ∆MC. The rate of cost pass-through is given by
∆P
∆MC
=
∆P
∆P + ∆S
=
−∆QDq
∆QSq −∆QDq =
−Dq
Sq −Dq ≤ 1 (1)
where Dq < 0 and Sq > 0 refer to the slope of the (inverse) demand and marginal cost
function, respectively, and ∆S is the difference in the marginal cost function as the quan-
tity changes. With inelastic demand or infinitely elastic supply, ∆P/∆MC = 1, such that
allowance costs are fully passed through to the electricity price. In general, cost pass-through
in a perfectly competitive market decreases with the change in demand, and with the slope
of the marginal cost function.
Figure 1: Cost pass-through under different market structures
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With imperfect competition, firms set their marginal costs equal to marginal revenue, as
illustrated in panel (b). The rate of cost pass-through is then given by
∆PM
∆MC
=
∆PM
∆S + ∆MR
=
−Dq
Sq −MRq (2)
where MRq is the slope of the marginal revenue function. Since the marginal revenue function
is steeper than the demand curve, it follows that (2)<(1). Intuitively, cost pass-through is
lower if the output market is not competitive, because the monopolistic (or oligopolistic) firm
absorbs a part of the cost increase by lowering its profit margin.
Eqs. (1)-(2) imply that pass-through below unity can occur due to either a demand re-
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sponse, imperfect competition, or a combination of the two. Short-term demand for electric-
ity is most likely inelastic, because it is the sum of demand by retailers (who face a completely
price-insensitive demand by consumers) and industry. Demand for wholesale electricity by
the latter may be somewhat elastic, because plants can ramp production up and down, but
this entails potentially large opportunity costs.
Expressions (1) and (2) hold as long as the demand curve is linear. In contrast, if the
demand curve is sufficiently curved (e.g., if demand is iso-elastic), the marginal revenue curve
is flatter than the demand curve, as illustrated by panel (c) in Figure 1.6 In this case, cost
pass-through under imperfect competition will be more than complete, because the markup
increases as the equilibrium level of output decreases. This situation may be relevant during
periods of very high electricity demand.
Finally, note that there exist an alternative concept for cost pass-through. In international
economics, pass-through is usually measured as the effect of a change in a particular input
price (or currency) on output prices (for a review, see Burstein and Gopinath, 2014). Under
this definition, input substitution lowers the rate of pass-through. Linn et al. (2014) apply
this concept to electricity prices in the US and report a variation in the pass-through of the
gas price decrease across regional markets and load periods, along with changes in emissions.
The underlying reason is the heterogeneity in the number of hours during which gas is the
price-setting technology. In contrast, the composition of inputs does not affect the rate of
“cost-based” pass-through as defined in this subsection, unless it is accompanied by a change
in the markup.
2.2 Empirical model
The electricity price PE at time t is the sum of fuel costs (FC) and allowance costs (AC) of
the marginal generating unit (MGU), a markup µ (all of which depend on demand Qt), and
6Expression (2) is based on linear demand and supply functions. More generally, the slope of the MR function
is steeper than the slope of the demand function if 2Dq +QDqq < Dq or −DqqQ/Dq < 1, i.e. if the elasticity of
the slope of the inverse demand function is less than unity. This is trivially the case for linear demand because
Dqq = 0, but this condition does not generally hold. For example, consider the case of iso-elastic demand with
D = αQ−1/β , with α > 0, β > 0. The elasticity of the slope of demand is then equal to−DqqQ/Dq = 1+1/β > 1.
For a more detailed discussion of pass-through under imperfect competition, see Seade (1985).
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a constant that reflects variable costs that are independent of fuel and allowance costs:
PEt = c+ αF · FCt + αA · ACt + µt (3)
The fuel and allowance costs of the MGU depend on its heat rate hmt (measured in MWh
fuel/MWh electricity), the emission factor efm of the fuel associated with the MGU (a physical
constant measured in tCO2/MWh fuel), and prices for fuel and allowances:
FCt = hr
m
t · P F,mt (4)
ACt = hr
m
t · efm · PAt (5)
Because I do not observe the true fuel and allowance costs of the MGU, I estimate them
based on a merit order model (see below), which introduces a measurement error. I also do
not observe the markup. For estimation purposes, (3) therefore becomes
PEt = s0 + αF FˆCt + αAAˆCt +DtΓ + t (6)
with s0 = c+ µ¯
FˆCt = FCt + e
F
t ; AˆCt = ACt + e
A
t
t = ut +
[
µt(Qt)− µ¯
]− αF eFt − αAeAt
There are two problems with estimating (6) by OLS. First, if demand is price-sensitive, the
identity of the marginal generator (and thus its heat rate and its emissions factor) is jointly
determined with the electricity price, rendering fuel and allowance costs endogenous. And
second, the presence of the measurement errors eFt and e
A
t means that even if demand were
completely inelastic, the coefficient estimates for αF and αA will be biased because AˆCt and
FˆCt are correlated with the error term by construction.7
To address these problems, I employ an instrumental variable (IV) estimation approach,
with fuel and allowance prices serving as instruments. These instruments are valid if they
are (i) correlated with fuel and allowance costs, which is true by construction of (4)-(5), and
(ii) uncorrelated with the error term t. Whether the latter condition holds cannot be tested
7If two or more explanatory variables are measured with error, all coefficients are biased, and the direction
of the bias is unknown and in fact unknowable (see e.g. Greene, 2002, p. 85).
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directly. Instead, I provide theoretical arguments for why I expect it to hold in the following,
and use an over-identified model (or rather, a series of over-identified models) that allows
me to test for the over-identifying restrictions they impose.
The error term in (6) is likely to be driven by mean-reverting shocks in demand and
supply. For example, a sudden decrease in wind power could lead to a spike in electricity
prices beyond the marginal cost increase according to the merit order, if firms are unwilling
to switch on a coal generator only to ramp it down again a few hours later. The error may
also contain a measurement error (if the true MGU differs from the one computed based
on my dispatch model), and a change in the markup. In contrast, nonstationary changes in
demand and supply, e.g. due to an increase in the installed renewables capacity in economic
activity, should lead to an adjustment of the merit order, and thus not to a change in the
contemporaneous error term. The validity of the exclusion restriction therefore hinges on the
(lack of) correlation between fuel and allowance prices and short-term shocks in the demand
and supply of electricity.
Fuel prices are determined on a global level and thus unlikely to be related with tem-
porary shocks in the German electricity market. The early empirical literature reported a
correlation between weather and the allowance price, but only during Phase I of the EU ETS.
Since Phase II and the possibility of allowance banking, the allowance price has been found
to be affected by changes in stationary variables such as fuel prices or hydro reservoir levels,
but not by mean-reverting shocks (Aatola et al., 2013; Lutz et al., 2013). The theoretical
reason behind these findings is that with allowance banking, the price is determined by the
cumulative expected allowance demand until infinity, which depends on changes in nonsta-
tionary variables only.8 For a literature review about allowance price determination in the EU
ETS, refer to Hintermann et al. (2016).
Finally, the vector of dummies Dt in (6) includes dummies for hours when heat-optimized
combined power and heat (CPH) plants are marginal, and when residual demand is nega-
tive.9 In some specifications I also add yearly, monthly and weekday-hour dummies. In all
models, the null hypotheses of complete and equal pass-through for fuel and allowance costs
8Hintermann (2010) expresses the effect of a mean-reverting shock as a function of the time left to the end
of the system, which was December of 2007 during Phase I of the EU ETS. With unlimited banking, the relevant
time horizon is infinity, such that the effect of mean-reverting shocks on the permit price is nil.
9Negative residual demand occurs in 2013 only, and usually corresponds to negative electricity prices. During
these hours, producers pay a price for keeping their plants online due to startup and ramping costs.
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are αF = αA = 1.
As an alternative to model (6), I also estimate cost pass-through using the OLS estimator
on allowance and fuel prices, rather than the IV estimator for marginal input costs, which is
the natural approach if the identity of the MGU is not known and the method of choice in
most of the pass-through literature:10
PEt = b0 +
∑
F=C,G,O
βFP
F
t + βAP
A
t + βdDt + βxXt + νt (7)
The indices in the summation term refer to coal, natural gas and oil, and the vector Xt
includes controls for contemporaneous shocks to the demand and supply of electricity. As in
(6), the constant includes the mean markup, whereas the hourly deviation in the markup is
part of the error term νt.
To derive the identifying restrictions required to determine the level of cost pass-through
from the price coefficients, I re-write the data generating process (3) using (4)-(5) as
PEt =c+ µt + αF ·
∑
F=C,G,O
hrF,mt · P Ft + αA ·
∑
F=C,G,O
hrF,mt · efF · PAt (8)
where hrF,mt is equal to the heat rate of the MGU if fuel type F is marginal, and zero oth-
erwise. Let h¯rF ≡ ∑T hrF,mt /T refer to the unconditional average heat rate, and h¯rFm ≡∑
T hr
F,m
t /TF to the average heat rate conditional on fuel F being on the margin, where TF is
the number of hours during which fuel type F is price-setting. If the heat rate is independent
of input prices, it can be replaced by its mean.11 In this case, OLS on fuel and allowance
prices yields unbiased estimates that correspond to
βˆF = αˆF · h¯rFm · (TF/T ) (9)
βˆA = αˆA ·
∑
F
h¯r
F
m · efF · (TF/T ) for F = C,G,O (10)
10Examples include Fell (2010); Fell et al. (2015); Fezzi and Bunn (2010); Honkatukia et al. (2013); Sijm
et al. (2008, 2006). Note that these papers estimate cost pass-through based on electricity futures, which
removes the need to control for contemporaneous shocks to demand and supply, but which does not allow to
study cost pass-through on an hourly level.
11To see this, suppose we regress a vector Y on a vector X ≡W Z, where "" is the pointwise multiplication
operator. If W and Z are independent, it follows that E[W  Z] = E[W ] · E[Z], such that we can regress Y on
X˜ ≡ E[W ] ·Z. Note that the independence assumption applies to the unconditional average heat rate, which is
affected by the number of hours a technology is price-setting.
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Identification is achieved by adding the restriction that the marginal generation shares
TF/T have to sum to one. Solving (9) for the marginal generation shares and substituting
into the identifying restriction and (10) leads to the following hypotheses of complete cost
pass-through:
H˜F0 : αF =
∑
F
βF
h¯r
F
m
= 1 ; H˜F1 : αF 6= 1 (11)
H˜A0 : αA = βA ·
∑
F βF/h¯r
F
m∑
F βF · efF
= 1 ; H˜A1 : αA 6= 1 (12)
A rejection of the null hypotheses (11)-(12) is consistent with incomplete pass-through,
but also with a violation of the underlying assumptions. If the heat rate of the marginal
generator is not independent of input prices, then OLS on (8) yields biased estimates, because
input prices are correlated with the error term (see Appendix A1). Since the merit order
depends on fuel prices, and the heat rate depends on the merit order, the independence
assumption is not likely not hold. Whether this is quantitatively relevant is an empirical
question, which I address by comparing the estimates for cost pass-through based on prices
with those based on marginal costs.
Lastly, some of the empirical literature has worked with fuel spreads rather than electricity
prices (see e.g., Sijm et al., 2008, 2006) and has regressed these spreads on allowance prices,
which requires an assumption about a particular technology being on the margin in a given
load period, as well as an average heat rate for that technology. In the Appendix I show that
this procedure is even more susceptible to bias than the price-based approach.
3 Market environment and data
In this section, I describe the German electricity market, present the data, and describe the
computation of marginal input costs.
3.1 The German electricity market
The German electricity market was liberalized in 2005 in the context of EU-wide energy
market reforms. Transmission remains a regulated natural monopoly, but wholesale market
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prices are unregulated. There are three types of markets: Forward, day-ahead, and intra-day.
All three are wholesale markets in which suppliers of electricity sell power to retailers, and to
large industrial consumers. In contrast, electricity retail prices are fixed over several months,
such that cost pass-through to retail consumers cannot take place in the short run.
Of the three wholesale markets, the forward market is the largest by volume. The Euro-
pean Energy Exchange (EEX) offers standardized futures contracts for maturities of up to 6
years. Contracts are available separately for baseload and peak hours (8 a.m. to 8 p.m. on
workdays) and are specified in terms of MW per relevant load period.12 Electricity futures
are settled financially, based on the difference between the futures price and the day-ahead
price that materializes throughout the delivery period.
In addition to the forward market, power is bought and sold for every hour of the fol-
lowing day on the European Power Exchange (EPEX). This day-ahead market is sometimes
also referred to as the spot market. In this market, power suppliers, retailers and industrials
balance out their forward positions based on their expected need for the next day. The in-
dividual demand and supply bids are aggregated into market demand and supply curves for
every hour, and the hourly market-clearing price is established. Note also that there is just
one aggregate supply curve and one aggregate demand curve, leading to a single generator
being marginal at any hour.13 Transmission constraints are accommodated by means of intra-
day adjustments. In order to ensure that demand equals supply at each moment in time given
the distribution of production, consumption and the existing transmission lines, the TSO is
responsible for real-time balancing and thus has the ability to bring individual generators on-
and offline. Some of this balancing is market-based (the third market), but the liquidity in
this intra-day market is very low. The remaining real-time adjustments are made by the TSO
12For example, the seller of a one-year baseload futures contract promises to supply one MW of electricity for
each of the 8,760 hours of the next calendar year at the specified price, whereas the seller of a peak contract
promises to supply 1 MW during peak hours only. To avoid confusion with the physical load, I use the terms ”all
hours” and “peak hours” (rather than baseload and peak load) when referring to time.
13Generally, there will be more than one marginal generators if there are binding transmission constraints.
This is relevant e.g. in the US electricity markets. However, transmission constraints are explicitly ignored in the
German day-ahead auctions and dealt with on an intra-day basis by the Transmission System Operator (TSO). As
a rule, inframarginal generators that are forced off-line by the TSO are compensated according to the market-
clearing price, whereas extramarginal generators that are forced to come online are compensated based on
their (rejected) bid. Since firms do not know exactly when and where transmission constraints will be binding,
and who will be forced offline or online in such a case, this system leaves little scope for price manipulation
for generators that could potentially end up being marginal during a given hour. Since I’m interested in the
marginal generator, strategic over-bidding for generators that are extramarginal with a high probability (in the
hope of receiving this high price as a compensation if they are forced online) would have no impact on my
results.
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based on system requirements.
The electricity markets in Europe are organized on a national level in the sense that firms
can only place supply bids into their respective national market, which allows me to focus
on the German generation portfolio only. Applying so-called “market coupling”, exchanges
use the available transmission capacity to minimize cross-border price differentials, whereas
firms cannot place bids for cross-border transmission capacity themselves.14
3.2 Data
The sample period covers the period from January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2013. My
dependent variable is the hourly day-ahead electricity price from EPEX. For input prices, I
use the EUA spot price, the next-month CIF ARA coal price, the EGIX natural gas price index
for Germany, and the price for FOB ARA gasoil with a sulphur content of 0.2%, all of which
are traded on EEX.15 As price information for inputs only exists for weekdays, I fill in prices
for weekends and holidays with the last available price. I converted all prices into euros.
In order to match up the electricity prices from the day-ahead market with actual delivery,
I shifted the price data forward by one day such that delivery dates coincide. I accessed all
prices via Thomson Reuters Eikon. Figure 2 shows daily input prices and the daily average of
the electricity price. Summary statistics of all included variables are provided in Table 1.
To determine the residual demand for fossil-based electricity, I start with total demand
for domestic electricity generation, which is the sum of hourly demand from consumers and
industry, electricity use for pumped storage, and hourly net exports to other countries, all of
which are obtained from ENTSO-E.16 From this total hourly generation, I subtract generation
from sources that have low marginal costs and can therefore be assumed to run whenever the
corresponding plants are not in maintenance. These "must-run" technologies include lignite,
14Market coupling between Germany, France, Benelux and NordPool has been instituted in 2010. Since May
2015, all markets across north-western Europe are integrated via multi-market coupling. For more information
about market coupling in Europe, see www.epexspot.com/en/market-coupling, last accessed in March 2016).
15CIF stands for cost, insurance and freight and means that the price is inclusive of these costs; in contrast,
FOB is an acronym for free on board and indicates that shipment and insurance have to be paid by the buyer.
ARA stands for entry into Europe at the ports of Amsterdam, Rotterdam or Antwerp. The EEX CIF ARA coal
future is based on the API(2) index, which is computed using price information on all coal entering north-
western Europe by ocean freight. Since the coal spot market is not very liquid, the nearest-term future market
is interpreted as the closest substitute.
16European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity, available at https://www.entsoe.eu/.
Because of the inability of German suppliers to bid into the French market and vice versa, I treat net exports
(=exports-imports) as exogenous.
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Figure 2: Daily prices for electricity, fuels and EUAs
Source: Data from Thomson Reuters Eikon
nuclear, renewables (wind, solar, hydro and biomass) and waste incineration.17 Hourly pro-
duction of electricity from must-run sources are provided by the EEX Transparency platform,
with the exception of biomass and waste incineration, for which I divided monthly data from
the German Federal Environment Agency among the number of hours per month.18 EEX also
provides hourly information about planned outages by technology.
A problem that arises is that the hourly values for demand and generation by nuclear,
hydro and lignite, aggregated up to the monthly level, do not exactly match up with the
monthly values, which are more complete and correspond to annual totals. Reasons for the
difference are net vs. gross generation and that some insular industrial nets are not included
in the hourly values. In order to get consistent numbers, I calibrate everything to the level
of the monthly data by multiplying the hourly values with a monthly correction factor for
demand, and for generation by nuclear, lignite and hydro. In addition, I include an additive
correction factor to include generation by "other" fossil generation (e.g., by peat or the non-
17Although lignite generation clearly has positive marginal fuel costs, lignite-based generators typically run
continuously due to the very high startup and ramping costs; in fact, lignite generation in Germany is less
variable than nuclear generation, as shown in Fig. 6 below. Also, since generation by biomass is typically
associated with feed-in tariffs, I consider biomass as inframarginal, although the true marginal production costs
may be considerable.
18Publication titled "Erneuerbare Energien in Zahlen", available at http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/themen/klima-
energie, last accessed in Feb. 2014.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (N=35’064)
Unit Mean St.dev. Min Max
Elec_spot Euro/MWh 43.97 16.46 ‐221.99 210.00
EUA Euro/tCO2 9.79 4.32 2.68 16.84
Gas Euro/MWh 23.15 4.16 11.29 29.06
Coal Euro/MWh 10.16 1.54 7.19 13.83
Gasoil Euro/MWh 54.56 7.95 34.37 66.46
Demand MWh 61'662 11'762 33'991 92'174
Net exports MWh 2'015 3'595 ‐9'605 14'299
Pumps MWh 880 672 0 1'791
Must_run MWh 42'629 6'889 22'879 76'859
   Nuclear MWh 12'035 3'029 4'066 19'029
   Lignite MWh 15'822 2'086 7'120 20'849
   Other fossil MWh 1'710 996 44 7'247
   Solar MWh 2'598 4'375 0 30'324
   Wind MWh 5'481 4'965 95 32'187
   Hydro MWh 2'550 1'418 473 11'776
   Biomass MWh 3'481 548 2'726 4'122
   Waste MWh 661 104 518 783
Correction MWh 860 826 ‐988 3'097
Fuel cost MGU Euro/MWh 29.56 11.00 0.00 198.89
Carbon cost MGU Euro/MWh 7.34 3.59 0.00 15.11
MC= FC+CC Euro/MWh 36.90 11.69 0.00 204.98
Source: Thomson Reuters, ENTSO-E and own computations
biogenic part of garbage), which are not included in the hourly data, and to account for the
difference between hourly and monthly numbers for renewable generation (mostly due to
biomass) and net exports.19
The variation in daily electricity prices in Figure 2 far exceeds the variation in input prices,
and the hourly price variation is even greater, ranging between EUR –222 /MWh to EUR
210/MWh. This variation mainly comes from fluctuations in total demand and the supply of
"free" electricity via the generation of renewables, as shown in Figure 3.
Besides significant variation over time, electricity prices and residual demand also exhibit
a pronounced intra-weekly variation. Figure 4 shows the average price for each hour of the
week (starting with the hour from midnight to 1 a.m. on Monday), along with residual and
total demand. The latter is known as the load curve, because it reflects the total electric load
19The means of the monthly scaling factors are 1.134 for demand, 1.007 for nuclear, 1.024 for lignite and
2.107 for hydro generation. For generation by other fossil fuels or biomass there is no underlying hourly series
that could be scaled to monthly levels, such that an additive correction is necessary. For net exports, there
are some months where the hourly and monthly totals do not have the same sign. Applying a multiplicative
correction factor would switch the export balance for each hour, including those with a high net export or net
import. Similarly, a proportional correction of renewables would to lead to some hours with unrealistically high
levels of renewable generation.
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Figure 3: Daily averages for demand, generation by renewables and net exports
Source: ENTSO-E and Thomson Reuters
in the grid per hour. The figure shows that the influx of renewables occurs mainly during
the day, with the effect of flattening the daily residual demand curve. Looking closely at the
latter reveals a bimodal daily distribution (in contrast to the unimodal total demand), which
corresponds to the two daily peaks in the hourly electricity prices.
3.3 Computing the marginal fuel and allowance cost for each hour
To compute marginal input costs, we need to identify the marginal generating unit (MGU),
which requires the construction of a generation dispatch (or merit) order.20 I do this by
intersecting hourly residual demand for fossil-based electricity with Germany’s fossil-based
generation portfolio. The merit order exhibits several sources of variation. It changes over
the long run (i.e., months to years) due to additions, retirements or retrofits of generators.
The variation in input prices can translate to a daily variation in the merit order. Finally,
the merit order changes on an hourly basis due to planned outages and heat demand from
combined power and heat (CPH) plants. More details an be found in the Appendix.
20The merit order is the sequence according to which generators are brought online; in a liberalized market
such as Germany, the merit order is typically based on least production cost, although firms may place supply
bids above or below the marginal cost of production in order to stay inframarginal or extramarginal for a given
hour, or in an effort to manipulate prices. This is the main source of measurement error in my model.
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Figure 4: Intra-week variation of prices, demand and supply by renewables
Source: Own computations based on data from ENTSO-E and EEX
As my main input for the generation portfolio, I use a dataset provided by the German
Federal Environmental Agency, which contains information about all generators with an in-
stalled (gross) capacity of at least 100 MW at the end of each calendar year.21 From this, I
extract generators that use as fuel inputs hard coal, natural gas, oil and process gas.22 The
information available includes the type of fuel, the technology, the year of construction and
any major update or retrofit, and whether the generator is used to generate heat or elec-
tricity for industrial processes. Because the dataset contains no information about the heat
rate of each generator, I compute it based on a set of empirical formulae that depend on fuel
type, technology and plant age, as described in Appendix A2. I compute the fuel cost of each
generator by multiplying the heat rate with the respective fuel price, and the emissions cost
by multiplying the heat rate with the fuel-specific emission factor (taken from IPCC, 2006)
and with the allowance price, as shown in (4)-(5). The merit order is formed by ranking
generators based on total marginal costs (the sum of fuel and emissions costs).
I then make three types of adjustments to the generation portfolio. The first concerns
21http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/daten/energiebereitstellung-verbrauch/kraftwerke, last accessed in
January 2014.
22Process gas (translated from the German term “Prozessgas”) includes all burnable gases that originate as a
byproduct of an industrial process, e.g. in the production of steel, coke and refined fuels or during mining. The
German terms of the various process gases are Gichtgas, Konvertergas, Kuppelgas and Raffineriegas.
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the total generation capacity and is based on a comparison of the dataset from the Umwelt-
bundesamt with a different dataset provided by the Federal Grid Agency, which includes a
more complete list of generators down to an installed net capacity of 10 MW but contains no
information about the employed technology. I add the difference in capacities by fuel type to
the Umweltbundesamt database, using the same technology mix and plant age distribution
per fuel type as the one observed in the latter.23 Table 2 contains the generation capacity
for 2013, along with the capacity adjustments and the average heat rate per fuel type and
technology, weighted by the capacity of each generator.
Table 2: Fossil generation portfolio
Net capacity 
(MW)
Included adjustment 
(MW)
Heat rate 
(MWh fuel/MWh elec.)
Coal 25,476 ‐377 2.57
Natural Gas 26,974 4,206 2.10
   CCGT 20,782 3,240 1.97
   OCGT 3,580 558 2.84
   Conventional 2,613 407 2.57
Process Gas 2,806 1,470 2.25
   CCGT 1,370 327 2.05
   Conventional 1,436 343 2.48
Oil 4,011 1,470 2.69
   OCGT 1,792 671 3.01
   Conventional 3,689 799 4.12
Total 59,267 6,768 2.35
Note: Data from Umweltbundesamt and Bundesnetzagentur. Lignite plants are excluded. CCGT and OCGT
stand for combined-cycle and open-cycle gas turbine, respectively.
The second adjustment pertains to outages. Operators may take generators offline for
planned maintenance, to add them to the capacity reserve, or for strategic reasons. Outage
information is collected by the TSO and made available on an hourly basis, aggregated by
fuel type. One way to proceed would be to use the outage shares to reduce each generator’s
capacity for that hour. However, because the marginal input costs are a nonlinear function of
capacity, and the average of a nonlinear function is not equal to the nonlinear function of the
expected argument, I carry out a Monte-Carlo analysis similar to that employed by Borenstein
et al. (2002). I randomly assign each generator a dummy equal to zero with a probability
given by the share of the respective generation source that is unavailable at a particular hour,
23Available at www.bundesnetzagentur.de, last accessed in January 2014. For coal, the difference is entirely
due to gross vs. net capacity (as there are no coal generators with a capacity of less than 100 MW), and I
therefore multiply the coal capacity in the Umweltbundesamt database by 0.985 to match it to the net capacity
provided in the Bundesnetzagentur datase.
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and equal to one otherwise, and multiply each generator’s capacity with this dummy.24 I then
compute the merit order, intersect it with residual demand for that hour and thus identify the
marginal fuel and allowance costs (i.e., the fuel and allowance costs of the MGU). I repeat
this procedure 200 times for each hour and then compute expected fuel and allowance costs
to be used in (6) from the average:
FˆCt =
1
200
200∑
i=1
hrm,it · P F,m,it (13)
AˆCt =
1
200
200∑
i=1
hrm,it · efm,it · PAt (14)
The third and final adjustment addresses the fact that a portion of electric generation
comes from combined power and heat (CPH) plants, some of which are operated based on
heat requirements rather than electric output. CPH plants are identified in the data, but
whether a plant is operated based on heat or electricity needs is not observed. When ig-
noring heat-based operation, my dispatch model predicts less generation by natural gas, and
practically no generation by oil, compared to actual output reported by fuel type reported on
the monthly level.25 Based on information about annual electric generation by gas-fired CPH
plants and monthly heat load curves for industry and households, I compute the amount of
hourly CPH generation and move a portion of it to the bottom of the merit order by assigning
it to an artificial generator with a marginal cost of 0.5 euro/MWh. To keep total generation
capacity constant, I decrease the capacity of the remaining CPH generators accordingly. I do
this in the context of the Monte-Carlo analysis described above, i.e. by randomly switching
off CPH generators with a probability equal to the share of the CPH capacity occupied for heat
generation during that hour. I calibrate the portion of CPH generation that is heat-optimized
based on the actually observed monthly generation by gas and oil in 2013.
The resulting merit order for coal, gas and oil generation for a typical weekday in the
summer of 2010 and the winter of 2013 is shown in Figure 5, for the hour 16:00-17:00.
24Suppose that 9% of coal capacity is unavailable in a given hour. Rather than reducing the capacity of all
coal generators by 9% in that hour, I assign each coal generator a dummy equal to zero with a probability of
0.09, and equal to one otherwise. Due to the random nature of this procedure and the differences in installed
capacities across generators, the available capacity during a particular iteration is generally not equal to the
actually available capacity. On average, however, actual and simulated capacities will match up.
25This is a common problem in the literature that seeks to model electric dispatch in the presence of CPH
generation; see e.g. Hirth (2013); Leuthold et al. (2012).
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Figure 5: Merit order and residual demand on 16.1.2013 (top) and 16.6.2010 (bottom)
At the very bottom of the merit order are gas and oil CPH plants that are optimized based
on heating requirements. Coal generation is on average cheaper than generation by gas, but
depending on fuel and allowance prices, the merit order includes areas that contain both coal
and gas generators. The most expensive plants are oil plants, and based on their marginal
cost of generation, they would practically never be used other than in the context of heat-
optimized CPH generation.
Generation from all energy sources is shown in Figure 6. Whereas the "must-run" tech-
nologies are actual production numbers, generation by coal, gas and oil is computed accord-
ing to my merit order model, as no monthly generation is available for these fuel sources.
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The generation portfolio that is relevant for residual demand generates about a third of the
total electricity, whereas the other two thirds are from to nuclear, lignite and renewable gen-
eration. The figure also shows that generation by renewables has increased over time, driving
out fossil-based generation in the process (mostly gas), but also replacing some of the nu-
clear power, the output of which was discretely reduced after the accident at the Fukushima
nuclear plant in March 2011.
Figure 6: Generation by energy source by month
Source: ENTSO-E (lignite, nuclear and renewables) and own computations
3.4 Robustness checks
In the following, I discuss the sensitivity of the results with respect to some of the assumptions
that underly the estimation of the production costs associated with MGU.
Adjustment of the generation portfolio. Since I do not observe the technology of the gener-
ators with a capacity between 10 and 100 MW that I add to my portfolio, I assume the same
technology distribution as for the larger generators. As a robustness check, I alternatively
assume that all of the additional technology is of the most efficient available type (CCGT for
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gas, conventional for oil), or of the least efficient type (OCGT for both gas and oil). The
average fuel and allowance cost of the MGU are practically identical to those in the base
model. Likewise, the point estimates from the IV regressions are not sensitive to the technol-
ogy choice for the additional capacity. This is most likely due to the fact that coal is marginal
during most hours, whereas the capacity adjustment only pertains to gas and oil plants.
Computing heat rates. I compute heat rates based on data from the literature and a subset
of plants in the dataset for which I was able to find information about the heat rate. The
fuel and allowance costs of the MGU affect my point estimates inverse-proportionally. For
example, if the true heat rates for all generators were 10 percent higher than the ones I
compute, then the true marginal costs would increase by 10% as well, and the true coefficient
estimates would be (100/1.1=) 91% of the ones I compute here. However, because the
computed heat rates closely match the subset of heat rates that are actually observed, a
significant (average) deviation between true and computed heat rates is unlikely. Individual
deviations are of course possible, but as long as these deviations are independent of input
prices this should not result in biased coefficients.
CPH generation. In addition to the parameter that defines the portion of CPH generation
that is operated based on heat requirements, the CPH adjustment also depends on the op-
portunity cost of process gas, because many process gas plants are used for heat generation.
In my model, I use a proportionality factor of 0.94 and an opportunity cost for process gas
that is 75 % of the natural gas price per unit of energy, because this best matched reported
monthly generation for 2013. As a robustness check, I re-computed the merit order based
on an opportunity cost for process gas of only 25% of the gas price, which results in a heat-
optimized share of CPH of 73%. The average fuel and allowance cost of the MGU change
from 29.31 and 7.26 (in euro/MWh) to 28.66 and 7.56, respectively. The results from the
base regression using this amended generation portfolio are virtually unchanged.
Dynamic constraints. When identifying the MGU, I abstract from dynamic constraints
faced by firms and implicitly assume that the firms’ supply bids for hour t is independent of
their supply bids for hours t−1 and t+1. In reality, there are costs associated with changing a
plant’s output, starting production, and minimum downtime requirements. One might try to
incorporate these costs, for example by increasing marginal costs for hour t if a plant has not
22
been running in hour t-1, or will not be running in t+1. However, there are different ways
of doing this, and none seems more convincing than the other from a theoretical point of
view.26 Whereas it can be argued that my model is correct on average as it replicates annual
generation reported on the monthly and annual level, it is likely that it misidentifies the
MGU for many individual hours (which is the main reason for my IV approach, as discussed
above). Figure 5 shows that the marginal cost curve is relatively flat over a large part of the
merit order, such that misidentifying the MGU should not lead to a large error in terms of
marginal input costs for medium loads. However, at hours with very low or very high demand
levels, mis-identifying the MGU could result in a substantial measurement error, and if the
mis-identification is not symmetric, then this would lead to biased estimates of pass-through
during these hours. To assess the sensitivity of my results with respect to the identification
of the MGU, I re-run my merit order model after varying residual demand by 2 GW during
hours of low and high demand.27 As discussed below, the qualitative pattern of pass-through
remains stable.
4 Results
I start by presenting the results from the marginal cost model, followed by those based on
the price model. I present the second-stage results from the base model and some alternative
specifications in the main text; the results from the corresponding first-stage and reduced-
form regressions are presented in Appendix A3.
4.1 IV regressions based on marginal costs
I estimate (6) based on a two-step generalized methods of moments (GMM) procedure that
yields efficient coefficient estimates and consistent standard errors in the presence of arbi-
trary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.28 As excluded instruments for marginal fuel
26Based on a similar argument, Borenstein et al. (2002) also chose to ignore ramping costs in their model.
27I allow for both a decrease and an increase in residual demand to allow for a range of strategic behavior.
For example, firms may temporarily increase the capacity of inframarginal generators during hours of very high
demand (which would shift the MGU to the right on the merit order curve), or restrict supply in order to drive
up prices (shift to the left). Similarly, firms could take generators at the bottom of the merit order offline (by
placing a very high bid) during hours of low demand or bid below marginal cost and thus decrease it.
28The model is estimated using Stata’s ivreg2 command, implemented by Baum et al. (2010). I implemented
the error correction using the Bartlett Kernel with automatic bandwidth selection proposed by Newey and West
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and allowance costs, I use prices for coal, natural gas and EUAs. In order to account for the
nonlinear nature of the merit order and to obtain an over-identified model that allows for an
orthogonality test for the EUA price, I further include the square of the natural gas price.29
The regression results from the second stage are shown in Table 3. The first column
contains the results for the base model estimated for all hours combined, whereas the second
column allows pass-through and the intercept to differ between peak and offpeak hours.
The next two pairs of columns show equivalent results after including yearly and monthly
dummies, and 168 week-hour dummies; for these regressions, the constant is equal to the
omitted dummy category and thus suppressed. For the regressions that allow for differential
pass-through during peak vs. offpeak hours, I additionally include interaction terms between
the peak dummy and fuel prices as excluded instruments.30
The results indicate complete, or near-complete, pass-through of both fuel and allowance
costs. Including time dummies affects the point estimates, but it also greatly increases the
confidence intervals. Although time dummies are often used in the context of hourly and/or
seasonal data, their inclusion may not be appropriate in the current context. In theory, they
proxy for variation in demand and supply throughout the week and the year. However, this
variation is already captured in the variation of marginal fuel and allowance costs. Adding a
proxy in addition to marginal input costs reduces the explanatory power of the latter, because
the coefficient estimates are based on the non-overlapping portion only.
All models are over-identified and thus allow for testing the corresponding over-identifying
restrictions. Based on Hansen’s J statistic, the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are
uncorrelated with the error term and that the endogenous regressors are correctly excluded,
cannot be rejected. I further carry out an orthogonality test for the allowance price, which
results in a C-statistic.31 Again, the null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected. Because
(1994), which resulted in a selection of 74 lags for all regressions.
29One could also include the oil price as an additional instrument. However, because (i) the coefficient
estimates are very similar to those from the model without the oil price, (ii) the orthogonality test for the oil
price failed in some instances, and (iii) my dispatch model indicates that oil is practically never on the margin,
I did not include the oil price in the IV regressions presented here.
30Because including all interaction terms results in multicollinearity (since all input prices multiplied with the
peak hour dummy are zero during offpeak hours), I focus on combinations of interaction terms that (i) pass the
test for over-identification of all instruments and (ii) result in an over-identified model even when removing the
allowance price. Among the remaining possibilities, I choose the combination that yields the best explanatory
power of the instruments as indicated by the Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic. The set of instruments employed
per regression can be seen in the first-stage results in Appendix A3.
31The Hansen J-statistic is a GMM-version of the Sargan-Hansen statistic used in the context of 2SLS. Under
the null, the test statistic is distributed chi-squared in the number of over-identifying restrictions, which is the
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Table 3: Pass-through during all hours combined, and during peak vs. offpeak hours
Base model Y/M dummies Y/M/W-H dum. No EUA
All hours Peak/offp. All hours Peak/offp. All hours Peak/offp. All hours Peak/offp.
Fuel cost 0.927∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗ 1.102∗∗∗ 1.127∗∗∗ 1.102∗∗∗ 1.040∗∗∗ 0.926∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗
(0.0526) (0.0519) (0.133) (0.137) (0.129) (0.143) (0.0531) (0.0526)
FC*peak -0.0364 -0.0726 0.182∗∗ -0.0388
(0.0622) (0.0642) (0.0630) (0.0627)
Allow. cost 0.962∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗ 0.936∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗ 0.922∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗
(0.0753) (0.0782) (0.234) (0.257) (0.228) (0.256) (0.0951) (0.0977)
AC*peak 0.252∗ 0.366∗∗ 0.244 0.255∗
(0.111) (0.130) (0.144) (0.112)
Peak 6.947∗∗ 6.395∗∗ 6.992∗∗
(2.242) (2.219) (2.250)
Const. 9.817∗∗∗ 7.367∗∗∗ 10.16∗∗∗ 7.681∗∗∗
(1.654) (1.482) (1.749) (1.586)
Endog. 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
Excl. instr. 4 6 4 6 4 6 3 5
J-Statistic 3.791 4.183 1.368 1.422 0.915 0.909 3.328 3.769
J-Stat., p 0.150 0.124 0.505 0.491 0.633 0.635 0.0681 0.0522
C-Stat. 0.433 0.379 1.329 1.328 0.776 0.790 . .
C-Stat., p 0.511 0.538 0.249 0.249 0.378 0.374 . .
Rsq 0.302 0.349 0.282 0.323 0.449 0.451 0.302 0.350
Note: N=35,064 for all regressions. Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. All regressions additionally include dummies for hours of negative residual demand, and
for hours where CPH plants are marginal. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
these tests are inconclusive in the sense that they are only valid conditional on the other
instruments satisfying the exclusion restriction, I also estimate a model where I drop the al-
lowance price as an instrument (last two columns in Table 3). The results are very similar to
those from the base model.32
The level of cost pass-through varies between peak and offpeak hours. This is especially
true for allowance costs, where the interaction with the peak dummy is significant in three out
of four model specifications, whereas only the model including hourly dummies provides an
indication for differential pass-through of fuel costs. In order to further investigate the issue
of varying levels of cost pass-through, I re-estimate the base model separately for all 168
number of excluded instruments minus the number of endogenous regressors. The C-statistic is a test of a
subset of the orthogonality conditions, in this case the one corresponding to the EUA price. The null hypothesis
of orthogonality is not rejected if the C-statistic and both J-statistics (from the full model and the model that
excludes the suspect instrument) are small.
32This may seem surprising, given that the allowance prices is a necessary proxy for allowance costs. However,
since coal and gas prices are known determinants of the allowance price, they account for a significant part of
the variation in allowance prices.
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Figure 7: Pass-through of fuel and allowance costs by week-hour
‐1
‐0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Fuel cost
‐1
‐0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
1 5 9 1 3 1 7 2 1 2 5 2 9 3 3 3 7 4 1 4 5 4 9 5 3 5 7 6 1 6 5 6 9 7 3 7 7 8 1 8 5 8 9 9 3 9 7 1 0
1
1 0
5
1 0
9
1 1
3
1 1
7
1 2
1
1 2
5
1 2
9
1 3
3
1 3
7
1 4
1
1 4
5
1 4
9
1 5
3
1 5
7
1 6
1
1 6
5
Week‐hour
Allowance cost
Note: Hour 1 starts at midnight on Monday, and hour 168 starts at 11 p.m. on Sunday
hours of the week. The coefficient estimates, along with 95-% standard intervals, are shown
in Figure 7. The point estimates for pass-through indicate that pass-through of allowance
costs varies significantly throughout the load curve, whereas fuel costs are passed through
more evenly. However, the standard errors are quite large.
To increase the precision of these estimates while at the same time using load period
differentiations that are less broad than the generic peak/offpeak load periods, I separate
the week into periods of very low demand (from 11 p.m. to 5 a.m.), very high demand
(from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. on workdays), and medium demand (all remaining hours). The
coefficient estimates are presented in Table 4. The results indicate highly variable allowance
cost pass-through of allowance costs, which exceeds unity during periods of high demand.
The estimates of cost pass-through are visualized in Figure 8. The leftmost cluster shows
pass-through for all hours combined, whereas the remaining clusters refer to a subset of
hours. The black bars correspond to 95-% confidence intervals. The figure shows that fuel
costs are passed through relatively evenly and (near) completely throughout the week. How-
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Table 4: Pass-through during hours with very low and very high demand
Base model Y/M dummies Y/M/W-H dum. No EUA
Fuel cost 0.974∗∗∗ 1.148∗∗∗ 1.152∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗
(0.0575) (0.133) (0.130) (0.0581)
FC*Low -0.00895 0.0345 0.0180 -0.00527
(0.0497) (0.0630) (0.0578) (0.0499)
FC*High -0.149∗∗ -0.178∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗
(0.0509) (0.0577) (0.0534) (0.0514)
Allow. cost 0.810∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗
(0.0864) (0.233) (0.229) (0.105)
AC*Low -0.0887 -0.204 -0.176 -0.0916
(0.0975) (0.147) (0.145) (0.0979)
AC*High 0.810∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ 0.890∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.140) (0.136) (0.113)
Low -5.163∗∗∗ -4.849∗∗ -5.239∗∗∗
(1.463) (1.530) (1.466)
High 3.849 3.449 4.040
(2.073) (2.109) (2.090)
Const. 10.18∗∗∗ 10.54∗∗∗
(1.820) (1.910)
Endog. 6 6 6 6
Excl. instr. 8 8 8 7
J-Statistic 4.154 0.975 1.378 3.643
J-Stat., p 0.125 0.614 0.502 0.0563
C-Stat. 0.482 0.900 1.342 .
C-Stat., p 0.487 0.343 0.247 .
Rsq 0.353 0.321 0.444 0.354
Note: N=35,064 for all regressions. Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. All regressions additionally include dummies for hours of negative residual demand, and
for hours where CPH plants are marginal. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
ever, pass-through of allowance costs vary across the load curve. During hours of high de-
mand, allowance costs are passed through more than completely, and the hypothesis of equal
pass-through of fuel and allowance costs is clearly rejected. In contrast, allowance costs are
passed through less than completely during hours of low demand, and this is statistically
significant for the models without time dummies.
The reason for heterogeneity in cost pass-through with respect to input type is not obvious,
since in principle firms should not care about the composition of their costs when deciding
about the degree of pass-through. However, the results are robust across model specifications.
As an additional robustness check, I re-estimate the regressions after shifting residual demand
by +/- 2 GW during hours of very low and very high demand, as discussed in section 3.4
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Figure 8: Cost pass-through of fuel and allowance costs by load period
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Note: Low demand marks the hours between 11 p.m and 5 a.m., and high demand the hours between 10 a.m.
and 4 p.m. during weekdays. The four results per input and load period correspond to the four models
presented in Tables 3-4.
(the results are presented in Figure A1 the Appendix). The pattern of the results from the
base model remains stable for high demand-hours in the sense that allowance cost pass-
through exceeds 100%. For hours of low demand, adding 2 GW to residual demand increases
allowance cost pass-through, such that the confidence interval includes 100%.
A possible explanation for differential cost pass-through are long-term contracts for fuel.
Although surplus fuel can in theory be sold on the market, this entails a transactions cost
that is likely to be much larger than the transaction cost associated with buying or selling
allowances (which is virtually nil). Note also that storing fuel is very costly, whereas emission
allowances are electronic entries in a firm’s operator holding account. Next, that allowance
costs are passed through to a greater extent during periods of high demand could be that
during these hours, firms are not constrained by dynamic considerations (an explanation
also proposed by Fabra and Reguant, 2014). In contrast, firms may bid below marginal cost
during periods of low demand in order not to have to shut down a plant for a few hours. This
would also explain why the difference in pass-through between fuel and allowance costs only
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appears during hours of high demand.
Finally, the result that allowance costs are passed through more than fully during periods
of very high demand could be an indication that the shape of the demand curve varies across
the load curve. With sufficiently inelastic and curved demand, pass-through of input costs
can be more than complete as discussed in the context of Figure 1.
Figure 9: Intercepts and residual demand by year, month and week-hour
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The result of on average complete (or near complete) pass-through of allowance costs
thus masks the presence of interchanging periods of incomplete and more than complete
pass-through, which has different implications for the competitiveness of the electricity mar-
ket than a result of constant and complete cost pass-through. The bars in Figure 9 shows the
coefficients on the monthly and week-hourly dummies, which were suppressed in Table 4.
These intercepts represent the so-called “green spread”, i.e. the price of electricity net of the
cost for fuel and emissions. With strict marginal cost pricing and no ramping costs, the green
spread would be expected to be constant as it recovers costs from labor and capital that are
fixed in the short run. The strong variation of the spread within the week and the year sug-
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gests the presence of a markup and/or of costs associated with startup and ramping. Given
the available data, it is not possible to separately identify the markup, but the striking cor-
relation with residual demand (black line) suggests the presence of a time-varying markup.
Note also that during some hours, the spread is negative, indicating that firms are willing to
bid below costs in order to avoid shutting their generators down.
4.2 Price regressions
To compare my results with purely price-based approaches, I regress electricity prices on
input prices (i.e., I use the OLS estimator on input prices rather than the IV estimator on
marginal cost). To control for contemporaneous shocks in demand and supply, I include
hourly generation by solar and wind, as well as heating and cooling degree days based on the
daily average temperature in the 11 largest German cities.33 To identify cost pass-through,
I use a heat rate for the average marginal coal and oil generators of 2.63 (in MWh fuel
input per MWh electric output) and of 2.0 for the average marginal gas generator,34 and an
emission factor of 0.341 (in tCO2 per MWh fuel) for coal and 0.202 for natural gas.
Table 5: Cost pass-through based on price regressions
All hours Offp. Peak Low d. High d. All hours Offp. Peak Low d. High d.
Imputed pass‐through
F 0.8783 0.8331 1.0194 0.8261 0.8898 0.6549 0.6083 0.7362 0.5791 0.6422
  st.dev 0.083 0.082 0.095 0.070 0.090 0.145 0.144 0.138 0.144 0.155
  p (F  =1) 0.145 0.041 0.839 0.013 0.220 0.017 0.007 0.056 0.004 0.021
A 1.5702 1.3550 1.3555 0.9216 1.8010 1.0699 0.9987 1.1745 0.7320 1.5874
  st.dev 0.319 0.313 0.316 0.239 0.399 0.310 0.288 0.320 0.241 0.499
  p (A =1) 0.074 0.257 0.261 0.743 0.045 0.822 0.997 0.585 0.267 0.239
  p (F  = A) 0.064 0.156 0.366 0.738 0.046 0.325 0.326 0.294 0.663 0.126
Imputed marginal generation shares (point estimates)
Coal 58% 61% 54% 81% 41% 80% 91% 65% 116% 55%
Natural gas 42% 39% 46% 19% 59% 20% 9% 35% ‐16% 45%
Marginal generation shares based on dispatch model
Coal 75% 79% 67% 84% 63% 75% 79% 67% 84% 63%
Natural gas 25% 21% 32% 15% 36% 25% 21% 32% 15% 36%
Oil 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4%
Base model Including Y., M. and H. dummies
Note: Standard errors computed using Delta method.
33Specifically, I define heating and cooling degree days (in degree Celsius) as HDD=18-temp if temp<18;
HDD=0 otherwise, and CDD=temp-22 if temp>22; CDD=0 otherwise.
34These are generic heat rates used for the computation of dark and spark spreads and correspond to an
efficiency of 38 % and 50 % (in MWh electric output per MWh fuel input), respectively. I exclude the oil price
because oil is practically never the price-setting technology.
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The results for imputed pass-through from the price regressions are shown in Table 5;
the full results from the price regression are presented in Appendix A3. The left panel refers
to the base model, and the right panel contains the results from a model that additionally
includes yearly, monthly and week-hourly dummies. The rates of pass-through are visualized
in Figure 10. The null hypothesis of complete and equal pass-through cannot be rejected, but
this is mainly due to the large confidence intervals. The point estimates for cost pass-through
differ from those from the marginal cost model.
Figure 10: Cost pass-through based on price model
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Note: The left bar for each input and load period corresponds to the base model, and the right bar to the
model that includes yearly, monthly and hourly dummies, respectively.
The imputed marginal generation shares (the TF/T in (9)) differ widely from the ones
computed with the merit order model. In general, the price model predicts gas to be on
the margin much more frequently than coal, due to the high correlation between gas and
electricity prices. This results in a lower carbon intensity of the average MGU (captured by
the summation term in (10)), and translates to a higher rate of allowance pass-through.
The difference between the results from the models based on marginal input costs, and
those based on input prices can in principle be due to three reasons: (i) The inclusion of
generation by renewables and temperature to control for demand and supply shocks is less
complete than the approach via residual demand, which includes all shocks to demand and
supply. In other words, the residual demand for fossil electricity is not identified, which leads
to biased estimates due to unobserved heterogeneity. (ii) As discussed in section 2, the price-
based approach requires an exogeneity assumption between fuel prices and the nature of the
marginal generator; since the merit order generally depends on fuel prices, this assumption
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most likely does not hold. (iii) It is possible that the exclusion restriction in the marginal cost-
based model is not satisfied, despite the tests for over-identification. No similar restriction is
required for the price regressions, which are based on OLS.
5 Conclusions
I estimate the rate of pass-through for fuel and allowance costs in the German wholesale
electricity market in the short run using hourly spot market data. By constructing a detailed
supply curve of fossil-based electricity and intersecting it with the residual demand for fossil-
based generation, I determine the marginal generating unit for every hour of the year, which
allows me to identify cost pass-through directly via the generation costs of the MGU. In order
to address issues related to endogeneity and measurement error, I estimate the coefficients
on fuel and allowance costs using an instrumental variable framework.
I find that allowance costs are passed through (near) completely to hourly wholesale
electricity prices on average. When focusing on pass-through during different parts of the
load curve, I find that allowance cost pass-through is lower during hours of low demand and
higher during hours of high demand, and that pass-through of allowance costs varies by much
more than pass-through of fuel costs. Both results are consistent with those reported by Fabra
and Reguant (2014) in the context of the Spanish electricity market. Possible reasons for this
pattern of cost pass-through are dynamic constraints in the sense that firms are willing to bid
below marginal cost when demand is very low in order to avoid shutting down a generator,
and differences in transactions costs between fuel and allowance inputs. The finding of more
than complete pass-through of allowance costs during periods of high demand could be due to
very inelastic and nonlinear demand during these hours. However, the possibility of biased
estimates can never be fully excluded in an IV regression approach, because the exclusion
restriction cannot be tested directly.
Whereas complete pass-through would be consistent, or at least not inconsistent, with
perfect competition in the electricity market, the variation of pass-through and of electricity
spreads over the load curve suggest that firms do behave strategically. Given the data, I can-
not identify the markup separately from ramping and startup costs, but the almost perfect
correlation between spreads and residual demand for fossil electricity suggest that the inter-
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cept includes a time-varying markup, which implies the exercise of market power at least
during some hours.
The similarity of my results to those by Fabra and Reguant (2014) suggests that it is
possible to identify the marginal generator even in the absence of firm-level bid data. To
more directly test the equivalence of the two approaches, a dispatch order-based approach
could be carried out in the context of the Spanish market, which I leave for future research.
Furthermore, I show that estimating cost pass-through based on input prices rather than
marginal input costs, as has been the standard procedure in the literature, leads to much less
precise estimates, and likely to bias due to the endogeneity of heat rates and input prices.
For the purpose of determining the incidence of carbon policy, however, what matters is
the rate of average cost pass-through. For all hours combined, pass-through of allowance
costs from the base model is in the range of 81%–111%. Combining cost pass-through with
a generous free allocation of allowances implies that the profits of electricity firms were an
increasing function of the allowance price (Hintermann, 2011). With complete cost pass-
through, the entire free allocation constitutes a windfall to firms. To put this into perspective,
consider the free allocation to the largest ten electricity firms in the EU. Combined, these
firms received around 1.7 billion free allowances for Phase I, and another 2.6 billion for
Phase II (Hintermann, 2015). Using annual average allowance prices and assuming full cost
pass-through, the value of this free allocation amounted to 72 billion euro during the first
eight years of the EU ETS.
Considering that the incidence of climate policy falls predominantly (and perhaps even
exclusively) on consumers, auctioning the allowances and using the revenue to lower preex-
isting taxes is preferable on normative grounds. My results thus validate the EU’s decision to
eliminate free allocation for Phase III for electricity producers in the EU-15. They also have
implications for free allocation in other cap-and-trade system around the world.
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Appendix
A1 Estimation bias in price and spread regressions
A1.1 Price regression
If the heat rate and the emission factor of the MGU are not independent of fuel prices, we can-
not factor out average heat rates and emission efficiencies. Re-writing (8) while suppressing
the constant, time dummies and control variables Xt for convenience leads to
PEt =
∑
F=C,G,O
βFP
F
t + βAP
A
t + νt (A1)
νt =
∑
F=C,G,O
(αFhr
F,m
t − βF ) · P Ft +
∑
F=C,G,O
(
αAhr
F,m
t ef
F − βA
) · PAt + ut (A2)
In order for the β′s to be unbiased, the corresponding input price has to be uncorrelated
with the error term. For example, the coefficient of the coal price is unbiased if the following
expression is zero:
E[PCt · νt] =
∑
F=C,G,O
E[PCt P
F
t · (αFhrF,mt − βF )]
+ E
[
PCt · PAt ·
∑
F=C,G,O
(
αAhr
F,m
t ef
F
t − βA
)]
+ E[PCt · ut] (A3)
If the heat rate and the emission factor of the marginal generator are independent of input
prices, the β′s and the α′s are as defined in (9)-(10), such that the terms in parentheses,
evaluated at their means, are zero. However, if heat rates, emission factors and input prices
covary, the above expression generally differs from zero, which in turn implies that the OLS
estimate for βC is a biased estimate for the marginal effect of the coal price on the electricity
price. The same logic applies to the coefficients of the other input prices as well.
A1.2 Spread regression
Regressing fuel spreads on allowance prices requires an assumption about a particular tech-
nology being on the margin in a given load period, as well as an average heat rate for that
technology. For example, to compute the dark spread as defined by the EEX, coal is assumed
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to be the marginal technology, with an average heat rate of 2.63 (corresponding to an ef-
ficiency of 38 %). Comparing such a regression to (7)-(8) and making the independence
assumption leads to the following interpretation of the allowance price coefficient and the
error term:
PEt − 2.63 · PCt = βA · PAt + ωt (A4)
βA = αA ·
∑
F=C,G,O
h¯r
F
mef
F · (TF/T ) (A5)
ωt = (αF h¯r
C
m − 2.63)PCt + αF
(
h¯r
G
PGt + h¯r
O
POt
)
+ ut (A6)
An unbiased estimate for βA requires that E[PAt · ωt] = 0. Because fuel and allowance
prices are related, the OLS estimator for βA is unbiased only if both parentheses in (A6) are
zero, which is the case if αF h¯r
C
= 2.63 and h¯rG = h¯rO = 0. Intuitively, fuel cost pass-through
has to be complete (αF = 1), the heat rate assumed for the spread regression corresponds to
the actual unconditional heat rate h¯rC , and no other fuel is marginal during the chosen load
period. Under these assumptions, (A5) can be solved for
αA =
βA
2.63 · efC (A7)
which is an unbiased estimate for allowance cost-pass-through. If, however, these conditions
do not hold (for example, if gas is marginal during some offpeak hours), then this estimator
for pass-through is biased. The restrictions that have to be imposed to obtain unbiased esti-
mates for cost pass-through using electricity spreads therefore exceed those required for the
price model.
A2 Computation of marginal input costs
A2.1 Calibration of hourly demand and supply to monthly levels
Residual demand for fossil-generated electricity is defined as total generation net of must-run
generation. Total generation has to be equal to the sum of total demand from consumers and
industry, net exports and the electricity used to operate the pumps that serve pumped hydro
storage. Must-run generation is the sum of nuclear, hydro, other renewables (wind, solar,
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biomass), lignite and "other" fossil fuel (i.e., other than lignite, coal, gas and oil). Wherever
available, I use hourly values for these groups. However, as discussed in the main text, the
hourly values aggregated to the monthly level typically do not coincide with the monthly
values reported by ENTSO-E. Since the latter is more complete, I calibrate everything to the
monthly data. For demand, nuclear, lignite and hydro, I multiplied the hourly values by a
monthly scaling factor.
For pump use, no hourly values are available. I therefore divided the monthly values
reported by ENTSO-E by the number of offpeak hours per month, under the assumption that
no pumping takes place during peak hours. For other fossil fuels, no hourly values are given
either. Since this type of generation (mostly non-biogenic part of waste and peat) tends to
run continuously, I divide it equally among all hours of the month.
There is a significant hourly variation in renewable generation and in net exports. Ap-
plying a correction factor that is greater than one and constant within a month leads to very
high generation by renewables during some hours (leading to negative residual demand),
and to net exports that exceed the total capacity. For some months, even the sign of aggre-
gated hourly and reported monthly net exports disagrees, which would lead to a negative
correction factor and thus a switch of all imports into exports, and vice versa, for that month.
For these reasons, I use an additive correction amount rather than a multiplicative scaling
factor to ensure that the monthly and hourly values coincide. I divide this correction amount
(which can be negative or negative) equally among all hours of a month.
Note that although there exist hourly values for generation by coal, gas and oil, these are
based on voluntary and partial reporting and thus cannot be used to check my model. For
2013, the only year for which such a comparison is possible, the aggregated hourly values
differ by the reported monthly totals by a factor of up to 4, depending on the month. Also,
there is a problem with the way generation by process gases is treated (burnable gases that
arise as a by-product during industrial processes). Whereas ENTSO-E includes generation by
process gas in its "Gas" category along with natural gas, at least some process gas generators
appear under the heading of "other fossil" in the hourly data.
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A2.2 Computing generator efficiencies
The UBA (Umweltbundesamt or Federal Environment Agency) database does not include
information about plant efficiency, only of the fuel type and technology, and I therefore need
to compute the efficiency (i.e., the inverse of the heat rate) for each generator. Because of
technological progress, the efficiency is a function not only of the employed technology and
the fuel input, but also of a plant’s age. Specifically, I compute the efficiencies η (in percent)
as a function of plant age y by
Hard coal: η(y) = 0.2982 · (y − 1950) + 28.821 (A8)
Gas and oil, conventional: η(y) = 44 · 0.2982 · (y − 1950) + 28.821
42.24
(A9)
Gas and oil, OCGT: η(y) = −0.0030165 · (y − 1952)2
+ 0.491436 · (y − 1952) + 21.00003 (A10)
Gas, CCGT: η(y) = 0.056667 ∗ (y − 1970) + 37.16667 (A11)
Relevant age for coal, OCGT and conv. : y = 0.56 · y(built) + 0.44 · y(retrofit) (A12)
Relevant age for CCGT plants : y = 0.74 · y(built) + 0.26 · y(retrofit) (A13)
The formula for coal in (A8) is taken from Folke (2000, p.47). The efficiency com-
puted with this formula closely matches the reported efficiencies for 10 coal generators in
my dataset that were never retrofitted. However, the literature does not indicate how the
year of retrofit, if any, should be weighted relative to the year of original plant construction.
Based on 7 retrofitted coal generators for which efficiency information, I derived weights for
year built and year retrofitted of 0.56 vs. 0.44, respectively. These weights were also applied
to conventional oil and gas plants, and to OCGT plants. Overall, the computed efficiency
deviates from the reported efficiency of the 17 coal plants, for which I have this data, by 0.11
percentage points.
For conventional oil and gas plants, Folke (2000, p.47) assumes that the rate of technolog-
ical progress matches that of coal plants. This leads to formula (A9), where 44 refers to the
efficiency of a representative conventional oil plant in 1995 (Hoster, 1996, p.49) and 42.24
is the efficiency of a representative coal generator in that year, computed based on (A8) .
For OCGT plants, there is no formula from the literature that could directly be tested, nor
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was I able to find efficiencies for the OCGT plants in my sample. Instead, I use data from
Unger and Herzog (1998), Hoster (1996) and Schneider (1998) and compute the empirical
formula in (A10) based on a second-order polynomial regression.
There is no external data nor formula for the efficiency of CCGT. However, I was able to
obtain efficiencies for 11 non-retrofitted CCGT plants in my sample and computed equation
(A11). Because retrofits to a CCGT plants typically only involve the second stage but not the
first, the implications of retrofitting for overall plant efficiency will arguably differ relative to
retrofits of plants that have a single cycle. I computed a separate weighting for the revision
date for 7 CCGT plants in my sample for which I found data. This yielded weights for the
year of construction and of retrofit of 0.74 and 0.26, respectively.
A2.3 CPH generation
Without further adjustments, my merit order model would lead to very little generation by
gas, and practically no generation by oil, which contradicts data on the annual level. The
reason is that some combined power and heat (CPH) plants are operated based on heat
requirements rather than electric output. We know which generators are CPH generators,
but we don’t know to which extent and during which hours they are operated based on
heat requirements. Total CPH generation by gas was reported to be 55.7 TWH in 2010
(Eurelectric, 2012, p. 169), and 52.9 TWh in 2012 (Statista, available at de.statista.com). I
was unable to find corresponding numbers for 2011 and 2013, but since total generation by
gas in 2013 was 47 TWh, I assume that the vast majority came from CPH plants. I fill in the
value for 2011 by interpolation. Let H be the amount of gas-based CHP generation in a year,
and let 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 be the share of this generation that is based on heat requirements. I then
distribute the amount q ·H among the twelve months of the year by using a weighted average
of a representative heat profile for households (Wuensch et al., 2013, p. 41) and industrial
requirement for process heat (assumed to be constant throughout the year), with the weights
corresponding to the relative importance of household vs. industrial demand (Wuensch et al.,
2013, p. 11). Dividing the resulting heat-based monthly generation by the number of hours
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in a given month gives the hourly amount of heat-optimized gas generation
ht = q ·H · sharemt /nt
where sharemt is the share of heat-based generation and nt is the number of hours in the
month to which hour t belongs. Let capcpht be the gas-based CPH capacity in hour t (recall
that due to outages, this capacity varies by hour). For each hour, I assign a share of the total
CPH capacity given by
min
{
ht
capcpht
, 1
}
(A14)
to a generic generator with zero marginal cost, such that it is always located at the bottom
of the merit order. To keep the total amount of CPH capacity constant, I then assign each
CPH generator a dummy that is equal to zero with a probability given by (A14), and equal to
one otherwise, and multiply its capacity with this dummy in the context of the Monte-Carlo
analysis described in the main text. For example, if 25% of total CPH capacity is needed to
provide heat in a given hour, I assign a quarter of total CPH capacity to a generic generator at
the bottom of the merit order and switch off all CPH generators with a probability of 25% .
Last, I choose the level of q such that total gas generation in 2013 coincides with the reported
gas generation. This led to q=0.94, implying that most CPH generation is in fact based on
heat rather than electric output. Note, however, that this number depends on the opportunity
cost selected for plants that run on process gas. As discussed in the main text, when dropping
the opportunity cost from 75% of the price for natural gas to only 25%, the heat-optimized
share of CPH output required to calibrate the model to 2013 data drops to q=0.73.
For oil-based CPH, I assign a certain fraction of the capacity of three generators identified
as CPH generators to the bottom of the merit order during the entire year, and an addi-
tional fraction during the winter months only, until monthly oil generation aggregated to the
monthly level matches up with monthly generation reported for 2013.
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A3 Additional regression results
Table A1: First-stage and reduced-form results from the base model, for all hours and
peak/offpeak (corresponding to the second-stage results in columns 1-2 in Table 3)
Baseload (all hours) Peak vs. offpeak hours
FC CC RF FC FC*Peak CC CC*Peak RF
Coal 2.485∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ 2.256∗∗∗ 2.475∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗ -0.0984∗∗∗ -0.453∗∗∗ 2.175∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.0310) (0.322) (0.168) (0.0753) (0.0298) (0.0305) (0.301)
Coal*Peak* 0.0187 2.530∗∗∗ -0.0128 1.084∗∗∗ 0.243
(0.134) (0.159) (0.0312) (0.0580) (0.232)
Gas -0.641 0.00940 -1.865∗ -0.743 -0.650 0.0384 0.309∗∗∗ -1.894∗
(0.608) (0.109) (0.811) (0.604) (0.373) (0.106) (0.0581) (0.772)
Gas*Peak 0.301∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ -0.0941∗∗∗ -0.627∗∗∗ -0.00311
(0.0560) (0.0668) (0.0110) (0.0185) (0.0788)
Gas sqared 0.0264 -0.000778 0.0573∗∗ 0.0264 0.0150 -0.000696 -0.00261 0.0581∗∗
(0.0158) (0.00247) (0.0201) (0.0156) (0.00936) (0.00240) (0.00140) (0.0193)
EUA 0.101 0.721∗∗∗ 0.895∗∗∗ 0.103 -0.0522 0.721∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.897∗∗∗
(0.0786) (0.0108) (0.137) (0.0763) (0.0417) (0.0107) (0.0127) (0.129)
Peak -3.573∗∗ -6.491∗∗∗ 2.205∗∗∗ 10.80∗∗∗ 8.376∗∗∗
(1.255) (1.416) (0.432) (0.727) (2.451)
CPH -15.71∗∗∗ -5.086∗∗∗ -34.79∗∗∗ -15.09∗∗∗ -1.881 -5.150∗∗∗ -0.867∗∗∗ -33.39∗∗∗
(2.096) (0.270) (4.198) (2.066) (1.011) (0.272) (0.245) (4.078)
Resdem.<0 -27.77∗∗∗ -3.720∗∗∗ -23.88∗∗∗ -27.46∗∗∗ -8.884∗ -3.753∗∗∗ -1.041∗ -23.24∗∗∗
(0.488) (0.162) (4.344) (0.634) (3.928) (0.211) (0.413) (5.596)
Constant 3.943 1.670 24.53∗∗∗ 5.149 5.241 0.932 -3.691∗∗∗ 21.79∗∗∗
(4.244) (1.028) (6.424) (4.271) (2.750) (1.015) (0.474) (6.080)
Note: N=35,064 for all regressions. Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The column headers refer to the
endogenous regressors (fuel costs and allowance costs and their respective interaction with the Peak dummy),
and RF stands for reduced-form.
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Table A2: First-stage and reduced-form results from the base model: High vs. low vs. other
hours (corresponding to the second-stage results in column 1 in Table 4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FC FC*Low FC*High CC CC*Low CC*High RF
Coal 2.441∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ 0.099∗ -0.096∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.238∗∗∗ 2.158∗∗∗
(0.180) (0.023) (0.045) (0.032) (0.015) (0.015) (0.332)
Coal*Low 0.107 2.533∗∗∗ 0.002 0.009 1.089∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.022
(0.102) (0.102) (0.002) (0.023) (0.055) (0.001) (0.163)
Coal*High 0.035 0.017 2.443∗∗∗ -0.054 0.005 1.023∗∗∗ 0.477∗
(0.140) (0.012) (0.191) (0.029) (0.007) (0.060) (0.211)
Gas -0.612 0.242∗∗∗ -0.315 0.013 0.012 0.153∗∗∗ -1.719∗
(0.600) (0.065) (0.234) (0.106) (0.026) (0.030) (0.781)
Gas*Low -0.346∗∗∗ -0.016 0.001 0.066∗∗∗ -0.504∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.239∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.028) (0.001) (0.008) (0.015) (0.000) (0.054)
Gas*High 0.429∗∗∗ -0.011∗ 0.807∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.004∗ -0.683∗∗∗ -0.367∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.005) (0.084) (0.012) (0.002) (0.017) (0.075)
Gas sqared 0.026 -0.004∗ 0.007 -0.001 0.003∗∗∗ -0.001 0.057∗∗
(0.016) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.019)
EUA 0.107 0.077∗∗∗ -0.024 0.721∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.016) (0.028) (0.011) (0.003) (0.006) (0.133)
Low 3.737∗∗∗ 0.980 -0.035 -1.477∗∗∗ 8.028∗∗∗ -0.001 -3.245∗
(0.900) (0.746) (0.031) (0.327) (0.629) (0.014) (1.637)
High -6.184∗∗∗ -0.023 -9.498∗∗∗ 3.426∗∗∗ -0.006 12.748∗∗∗ 12.327∗∗∗
(1.129) (0.122) (1.522) (0.437) (0.068) (0.695) (2.260)
CPH -14.351∗∗∗ -5.532∗∗∗ -0.497 -5.184∗∗∗ -2.241∗∗∗ 0.013 -32.163∗∗∗
(2.087) (1.136) (0.384) (0.268) (0.198) (0.083) (4.188)
Resdem.<0 -27.165∗∗∗ -5.250∗∗∗ -2.075 -3.772∗∗∗ -0.916∗∗∗ -0.174 -23.232∗∗∗
(0.573) (1.144) (1.615) (0.182) (0.226) (0.154) (4.763)
Constant 3.919 -2.064∗∗∗ 2.549 1.457 -0.855∗∗∗ -1.863∗∗∗ 22.921∗∗∗
(4.215) (0.511) (1.715) (1.028) (0.224) (0.239) (6.161)
Note: N=35,064 for all regressions. Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The column headers refer to the
endogenous regressors (fuel costs and allowance costs and their respective interaction with the "Low" and
"High" dummies), and RF stands for reduced-form.
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Table A3: First-stage and reduced-form results from model with yearly and monthly dum-
mies: All hours and peak/offpeak (corresponding to the second-stage results in columns 3-4
in Table 3
Baseload (all hours) Peak vs. offpeak hours
FC CC RF FC FC*Peak CC CC*Peak RF
Coal 1.738∗∗∗ -0.0926 1.593∗ 1.703∗∗∗ -0.304 -0.0835 -0.386∗∗∗ 1.473∗
(0.379) (0.0667) (0.687) (0.370) (0.183) (0.0668) (0.0492) (0.664)
Coal*Peak* 0.0279 2.534∗∗∗ -0.0132 1.084∗∗∗ 0.232
(0.131) (0.157) (0.0310) (0.0578) (0.230)
Gas -0.846 0.0447 -0.167 -0.912 -0.708∗ 0.0691 0.275∗∗ -0.122
(0.555) (0.143) (0.953) (0.542) (0.332) (0.139) (0.0851) (0.901)
Gas*Peak 0.302∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ -0.0940∗∗∗ -0.627∗∗∗ -0.00222
(0.0541) (0.0661) (0.0110) (0.0185) (0.0768)
Gas sqared 0.0363∗ -0.00172 0.0223 0.0355∗ 0.0188∗ -0.00154 -0.00246 0.0212
(0.0142) (0.00306) (0.0223) (0.0139) (0.00830) (0.00298) (0.00200) (0.0210)
EUA 0.199 0.741∗∗∗ 0.891∗∗∗ 0.197 0.0402 0.741∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.0198) (0.217) (0.114) (0.0646) (0.0195) (0.0184) (0.207)
Peak -3.684∗∗ -6.542∗∗∗ 2.207∗∗∗ 10.81∗∗∗ 8.415∗∗∗
(1.224) (1.400) (0.431) (0.725) (2.390)
CPH -15.58∗∗∗ -5.129∗∗∗ -34.90∗∗∗ -14.97∗∗∗ -1.909 -5.194∗∗∗ -0.927∗∗∗ -33.51∗∗∗
(2.131) (0.269) (4.048) (2.102) (1.022) (0.272) (0.244) (3.937)
Resdem.<0 -26.55∗∗∗ -3.698∗∗∗ -23.32∗∗∗ -26.23∗∗∗ -8.116∗ -3.732∗∗∗ -1.062∗ -22.70∗∗∗
(0.525) (0.164) (3.672) (0.787) (4.059) (0.214) (0.416) (4.873)
year=2010 10.50∗ 1.055 10.17 11.72∗∗ 9.173∗∗∗ 0.328 -4.016∗∗∗ 7.463
(4.330) (1.125) (7.483) (4.307) (2.594) (1.107) (0.543) (7.203)
year=2011 11.11∗ 1.025 9.720 12.36∗∗ 9.818∗∗∗ 0.297 -4.002∗∗∗ 7.104
(4.371) (1.157) (7.861) (4.341) (2.577) (1.138) (0.551) (7.578)
year=2012 12.29∗∗ 1.242 8.728 13.46∗∗ 10.76∗∗∗ 0.524 -3.666∗∗∗ 5.970
(4.644) (1.229) (8.144) (4.599) (2.755) (1.203) (0.585) (7.864)
year=2013 7.341 1.316 7.428 8.476 7.740∗∗ 0.605 -3.333∗∗∗ 4.603
(4.408) (1.296) (8.248) (4.353) (2.660) (1.267) (0.629) (7.958)
Note: N=35,064 for all regressions. Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The column headers refer to the
endogenous regressors (fuel costs and allowance costs and their respective interaction with the peak dummy),
and RF stands for reduced-form. The coefficients for the monthly dummies are suppressed.
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Table A4: First-stage and reduced-form results from the model with yearly and monthly
dummies: High vs. low vs. other hours (corresponding to the second-stage results in column
2 in Table 4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FC FC*Low FC*High CC CC*Low CC*High RF
Coal 1.678∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗ -0.247∗ -0.0824 -0.291∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗ 1.466∗
(0.377) (0.0614) (0.125) (0.0655) (0.0203) (0.0243) (0.680)
Coal*Low 0.106 2.533∗∗∗ 0.00186 0.00861 1.089∗∗∗ 0.000130 -0.0188
(0.102) (0.102) (0.00315) (0.0229) (0.0555) (0.00128) (0.163)
Coal*High 0.0344 0.0170 2.442∗∗∗ -0.0540 0.00536 1.023∗∗∗ 0.488∗
(0.134) (0.0128) (0.189) (0.0291) (0.00700) (0.0595) (0.208)
Gas -0.806 0.200∗ -0.496∗∗ 0.0455 0.0514 0.0981∗ -0.0150
(0.540) (0.0852) (0.178) (0.138) (0.0298) (0.0407) (0.907)
Gas*Low -0.346∗∗∗ -0.0163 0.00103 0.0658∗∗∗ -0.504∗∗∗ 0.0000559 -0.239∗∗∗
(0.0390) (0.0282) (0.00160) (0.00843) (0.0147) (0.000365) (0.0546)
Gas*High 0.432∗∗∗ -0.0108∗ 0.808∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.00379∗ -0.683∗∗∗ -0.368∗∗∗
(0.0557) (0.00473) (0.0833) (0.0116) (0.00191) (0.0175) (0.0745)
Gas sqared 0.0358∗∗ -0.00326 0.0125∗∗ -0.00159 0.00246∗∗∗ -0.000563 0.0220
(0.0139) (0.00205) (0.00443) (0.00295) (0.000666) (0.000945) (0.0213)
EUA 0.198 0.0655∗∗ 0.0679 0.741∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.888∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.0225) (0.0395) (0.0194) (0.00417) (0.00890) (0.211)
Low 3.737∗∗∗ 0.983 -0.0370 -1.481∗∗∗ 8.029∗∗∗ -0.00254 -3.269∗
(0.903) (0.747) (0.0433) (0.328) (0.630) (0.0147) (1.644)
High -6.223∗∗∗ -0.0311 -9.508∗∗∗ 3.425∗∗∗ -0.00780 12.75∗∗∗ 12.25∗∗∗
(1.105) (0.126) (1.507) (0.437) (0.0691) (0.694) (2.260)
CPH -14.21∗∗∗ -5.465∗∗∗ -0.493 -5.229∗∗∗ -2.217∗∗∗ -0.0194 -32.25∗∗∗
(2.119) (1.132) (0.415) (0.268) (0.196) (0.0833) (4.032)
Resdem.<0 -25.93∗∗∗ -5.287∗∗∗ -1.505 -3.751∗∗∗ -0.874∗∗∗ -0.224 -22.67∗∗∗
(0.635) (1.136) (1.581) (0.184) (0.220) (0.156) (4.097)
year=2010 10.55∗ -1.688∗∗ 6.473∗∗∗ 0.848 -0.899∗∗∗ -1.979∗∗∗ 8.793
(4.276) (0.627) (1.505) (1.123) (0.220) (0.271) (7.259)
year=2011 11.16∗∗ -1.612∗ 7.212∗∗∗ 0.815 -0.987∗∗∗ -1.925∗∗∗ 8.341
(4.325) (0.657) (1.527) (1.155) (0.230) (0.277) (7.635)
year=2012 12.25∗∗ -1.716∗ 8.192∗∗∗ 1.038 -1.169∗∗∗ -1.660∗∗∗ 7.164
(4.589) (0.703) (1.625) (1.228) (0.247) (0.294) (7.888)
year=2013 7.245 -1.682∗ 5.982∗∗∗ 1.117 -1.393∗∗∗ -1.357∗∗∗ 5.752
(4.349) (0.725) (1.537) (1.294) (0.264) (0.318) (7.954)
Note: N=35,064 for all regressions. Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The column headers refer to the
endogenous regressors (fuel costs and allowance costs and their respective interaction with the "Low" and
"High" dummies), and RF stands for reduced-form. The coefficients for the monthly dummies are suppressed.
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Table A5: First-stage and reduced-form results from model with yearly, monthly and hourly
dummies: All hours and peak/offpeak (corresponding to the second-stage results in columns
5-6 in Table 3
Baseload (all hours) Peak vs. offpeak hours
FC CC RF FC FC*Peak CC CC*Peak RF
Coal 1.663∗∗∗ -0.0932 1.383∗ 1.666∗∗∗ -0.218 -0.123 -0.555∗∗∗ 1.089
(0.382) (0.0669) (0.693) (0.373) (0.183) (0.0674) (0.0532) (0.684)
Coal*Peak* -0.0395 2.220∗∗∗ 0.0911∗∗∗ 1.540∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.131) (0.0246) (0.0479) (0.167)
Gas -0.807 0.0453 -0.0259 -0.895 -0.683∗ 0.0637 0.249∗ -0.0914
(0.539) (0.143) (0.850) (0.532) (0.325) (0.141) (0.0993) (0.846)
Gas*Peak 0.300∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ -0.0623∗∗∗ -0.486∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗
(0.0540) (0.0632) (0.00850) (0.0185) (0.0739)
Gas sqared 0.0360∗∗ -0.00173 0.0206 0.0356∗∗ 0.0190∗ -0.00166 -0.00291 0.0201
(0.0137) (0.00306) (0.0201) (0.0134) (0.00801) (0.00303) (0.00227) (0.0199)
EUA 0.199 0.741∗∗∗ 0.887∗∗∗ 0.200 0.0423 0.741∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.0199) (0.204) (0.108) (0.0601) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.197)
CPH -11.98∗∗∗ -5.119∗∗∗ -23.09∗∗∗ -11.53∗∗∗ -0.518 -5.158∗∗∗ -0.862∗∗∗ -22.21∗∗∗
(2.120) (0.264) (4.543) (2.125) (0.949) (0.264) (0.227) (4.472)
Resdem.<0 -23.30∗∗∗ -3.663∗∗∗ -13.18∗∗∗ -22.85∗∗∗ -6.136 -3.722∗∗∗ -1.164∗∗ -12.49∗∗∗
(0.625) (0.184) (3.126) (0.583) (3.257) (0.223) (0.404) (2.785)
year=2010 6.563 1.119 3.254 8.886∗ 7.580∗∗ 0.949 -1.451∗ 8.207
(4.276) (1.138) (6.940) (4.245) (2.482) (1.109) (0.687) (6.881)
year=2011 7.181 1.089 2.818 9.546∗ 8.243∗∗∗ 0.916 -1.452∗ 7.867
(4.353) (1.170) (7.332) (4.321) (2.504) (1.141) (0.699) (7.260)
year=2012 8.091 1.304 1.052 10.45∗ 9.121∗∗∗ 1.134 -1.150 6.110
(4.610) (1.244) (7.519) (4.577) (2.684) (1.214) (0.743) (7.465)
year=2013 2.942 1.377 -0.805 5.293 6.025∗ 1.210 -0.834 4.263
(4.405) (1.313) (7.511) (4.377) (2.631) (1.282) (0.793) (7.514)
Note: N=35,064 for all regressions. Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The column headers refer to the
endogenous regressors (fuel costs and allowance costs and their respective interaction with the peak dummy),
and RF stands for reduced-form. The coefficients for the monthly and hourly dummies are suppressed.
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Table A6: First-stage and reduced-form results from the model with yearly, monthly and
hourly dummies: High vs. low vs. other hours (corresponding to the second-stage results in
column 3 in Table 4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FC FC*Low FC*High CC CC*Low CC*High RF
Coal 1.626∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗ -0.247∗ -0.0834 -0.291∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗ 1.314
(0.379) (0.0619) (0.126) (0.0656) (0.0203) (0.0244) (0.690)
Coal*Low 0.0980 2.531∗∗∗ 0.00190 0.00841 1.089∗∗∗ 0.000135 -0.0484
(0.0967) (0.101) (0.00318) (0.0231) (0.0555) (0.00127) (0.135)
Coal*High 0.0283 0.0162 2.442∗∗∗ -0.0541 0.00537 1.023∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗
(0.120) (0.0120) (0.189) (0.0292) (0.00698) (0.0596) (0.174)
Gas -0.781 0.204∗ -0.498∗∗ 0.0466 0.0515 0.0980∗ 0.0933
(0.532) (0.0849) (0.179) (0.138) (0.0298) (0.0408) (0.852)
Gas*Low -0.351∗∗∗ -0.0171 0.00106 0.0657∗∗∗ -0.504∗∗∗ 0.0000578 -0.257∗∗∗
(0.0382) (0.0283) (0.00161) (0.00860) (0.0144) (0.000371) (0.0457)
Gas*High 0.438∗∗∗ -0.0102∗ 0.809∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.00381∗ -0.683∗∗∗ -0.349∗∗∗
(0.0552) (0.00447) (0.0836) (0.0117) (0.00192) (0.0175) (0.0638)
Gas sqared 0.0356∗∗ -0.00332 0.0126∗∗ -0.00161 0.00246∗∗∗ -0.000561 0.0208
(0.0135) (0.00204) (0.00444) (0.00295) (0.000663) (0.000947) (0.0202)
EUA 0.199 0.0655∗∗ 0.0685 0.741∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.886∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.0224) (0.0396) (0.0195) (0.00419) (0.00893) (0.204)
CPH -11.69∗∗∗ -5.108∗∗∗ -0.508 -5.188∗∗∗ -2.222∗∗∗ -0.0206 -23.09∗∗∗
(2.126) (1.138) (0.430) (0.263) (0.198) (0.0865) (4.538)
Resdem.<0 -23.12∗∗∗ -5.192∗∗∗ -1.483 -3.710∗∗∗ -0.900∗∗∗ -0.229 -13.43∗∗∗
(0.679) (1.062) (1.561) (0.195) (0.201) (0.159) (3.095)
year=2010 13.66∗∗ -1.348 6.428∗∗∗ -0.682 7.142∗∗∗ -1.982∗∗∗ 7.528
(4.408) (0.818) (1.512) (1.104) (0.651) (0.270) (6.993)
year=2011 14.28∗∗ -1.269 7.167∗∗∗ -0.714 7.055∗∗∗ -1.928∗∗∗ 7.088
(4.454) (0.851) (1.534) (1.134) (0.659) (0.277) (7.348)
year=2012 15.18∗∗ -1.393 8.149∗∗∗ -0.494 6.873∗∗∗ -1.663∗∗∗ 5.319
(4.699) (0.892) (1.634) (1.194) (0.670) (0.293) (7.554)
year=2013 10.02∗ -1.372 5.937∗∗∗ -0.419 6.649∗∗∗ -1.360∗∗∗ 3.462
(4.433) (0.925) (1.545) (1.254) (0.676) (0.317) (7.517)
Note: N=35,064 for all regressions. Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The column headers refer to the
endogenous regressors (fuel costs and allowance costs and their respective interaction with the "Low" and
"High" dummies), and RF stands for reduced-form. The coefficients for the monthly and hourly dummies are
suppressed.
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Table A7: First-stage and reduced-form results from model without the allowance price, for
all hours and peak/offpeak (corresponding to the second-stage results in columns 7-8 in Table
3)
Baseload (all hours) Peak vs. offpeak hours
FC CC RF FC FC*Peak CC CC*Peak RF
Coal 2.643∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗∗ 3.656∗∗∗ 2.636∗∗∗ 0.126 1.030∗∗∗ -0.0359 3.580∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.0641) (0.263) (0.163) (0.0855) (0.0643) (0.0196) (0.245)
Coal*Peak* 0.0183 2.530∗∗∗ -0.0157 1.083∗∗∗ 0.240
(0.134) (0.159) (0.0421) (0.0599) (0.236)
Gas -0.696 -0.385 -2.355∗∗ -0.799 -0.622 -0.355 0.164 -2.383∗∗
(0.629) (0.205) (0.851) (0.624) (0.386) (0.204) (0.0867) (0.812)
Gas*Peak 0.301∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ -0.0977∗∗∗ -0.628∗∗∗ -0.00759
(0.0561) (0.0667) (0.0128) (0.0186) (0.0800)
Gas sqared 0.0259 -0.00414 0.0531∗ 0.0259 0.0152 -0.00405 -0.00385 0.0539∗∗
(0.0156) (0.00493) (0.0207) (0.0154) (0.00928) (0.00488) (0.00209) (0.0199)
Peak -3.557∗∗ -6.499∗∗∗ 2.315∗∗∗ 10.84∗∗∗ 8.513∗∗∗
(1.255) (1.415) (0.515) (0.735) (2.479)
CPH -15.80∗∗∗ -5.743∗∗∗ -35.60∗∗∗ -15.19∗∗∗ -1.833 -5.810∗∗∗ -1.111∗∗∗ -34.21∗∗∗
(2.102) (0.348) (4.098) (2.073) (1.011) (0.347) (0.227) (3.974)
Resdem.<0 -27.79∗∗∗ -3.841∗∗∗ -24.03∗∗∗ -27.48∗∗∗ -8.875∗ -3.875∗∗∗ -1.086∗ -23.39∗∗∗
(0.485) (0.116) (4.517) (0.652) (3.918) (0.125) (0.465) (5.773)
Constant 4.863 8.263∗∗∗ 32.71∗∗∗ 6.084 4.766 7.484∗∗∗ -1.271 29.95∗∗∗
(4.593) (1.698) (6.824) (4.613) (2.937) (1.690) (0.656) (6.484)
Note: N=35,064 for all regressions. Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The column headers refer to the
endogenous regressors (fuel costs and allowance costs and their respective interaction with the Peak dummy),
and RF stands for reduced-form.
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Table A8: First-stage and reduced-form results from model without the allowance price: High
vs. low vs. other hours (corresponding to the second-stage results in column 4 in Table 4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FC FC*Low FC*High CC CC*Low CC*High RF
Coal 2.609∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ 0.062 1.031∗∗∗ 0.010 -0.017 3.575∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.019) (0.054) (0.065) (0.011) (0.010) (0.280)
Coal*Low 0.107 2.533∗∗∗ 0.002 0.011 1.089∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.019
(0.102) (0.102) (0.002) (0.023) (0.055) (0.000) (0.164)
Coal*High 0.035 0.017 2.443∗∗∗ -0.053 0.006 1.023∗∗∗ 0.478∗
(0.140) (0.012) (0.191) (0.038) (0.004) (0.061) (0.212)
Gas -0.670 0.200∗∗ -0.302 -0.381 -0.078 0.076 -2.215∗∗
(0.620) (0.069) (0.244) (0.204) (0.049) (0.045) (0.823)
Gas*Low -0.346∗∗∗ -0.016 0.001 0.067∗∗∗ -0.504∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.238∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.028) (0.001) (0.009) (0.015) (0.000) (0.054)
Gas*High 0.429∗∗∗ -0.011∗ 0.807∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.683∗∗∗ -0.369∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.005) (0.084) (0.013) (0.001) (0.018) (0.075)
Gas sqared 0.025 -0.004∗∗ 0.007 -0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.053∗∗
(0.015) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.020)
Low 3.731∗∗∗ 0.976 -0.034 -1.518∗∗∗ 8.019∗∗∗ -0.009 -3.296∗
(0.900) (0.744) (0.030) (0.337) (0.628) (0.006) (1.644)
High -6.180∗∗∗ -0.020 -9.499∗∗∗ 3.454∗∗∗ 0.001 12.753∗∗∗ 12.363∗∗∗
(1.124) (0.117) (1.522) (0.518) (0.046) (0.704) (2.294)
CPH -14.450∗∗∗ -5.602∗∗∗ -0.474 -5.845∗∗∗ -2.392∗∗∗ -0.116 -32.995∗∗∗
(2.094) (1.142) (0.383) (0.345) (0.227) (0.061) (4.080)
Resdem.<0 -27.183∗∗∗ -5.263∗∗∗ -2.070 -3.896∗∗∗ -0.944∗∗∗ -0.199 -23.387∗∗∗
(0.581) (1.130) (1.615) (0.120) (0.194) (0.154) (4.942)
Constant 4.900 -1.363∗ 2.328 8.051∗∗∗ 0.652 -0.571 31.215∗∗∗
(4.564) (0.553) (1.856) (1.708) (0.373) (0.338) (6.585)
Note: N=35,064 for all regressions. Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The column headers refer to the
endogenous regressors (fuel costs and allowance costs and their respective interaction with the "Low" and
"High" dummies), and RF stands for reduced-form.
51
Figure A1: Robustness check: Changing residual demand by +/- 2GW
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Estimates for cost pass-through from the base model, after changing residual demand during hours of high
demand (top left: -2GW; top right: +2GW), and during hours of low demand (bottom left: -2GW; bottom
right: +2GW).
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Table A9: Results from price regression. Dependent variable: Electricity price
Base model Including Y/M/W-H dummies
Baseload Peak/Offp. Low/High Baseload Peak/Offp. Low/High
Gas 0.746∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗ 0.264 0.00669 0.351
(0.139) (0.149) (0.138) (0.249) (0.257) (0.249)
Coal 1.330∗∗∗ 1.333∗∗∗ 1.361∗∗∗ 1.376∗ 1.460∗ 1.362∗
(0.334) (0.345) (0.337) (0.596) (0.607) (0.597)
EUA 1.079∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗ 0.853∗∗∗ 0.774∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.150) (0.150) (0.190) (0.191) (0.196)
rese -0.410∗∗∗ -0.734∗∗∗ -0.906∗∗∗ -0.938∗∗∗ -0.958∗∗∗ -0.955∗∗∗
(0.0536) (0.0570) (0.0541) (0.0510) (0.0532) (0.0525)
HDD 0.337∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗
(0.0512) (0.0470) (0.0464) (0.100) (0.0937) (0.100)
CDD 0.696 0.593 0.743 1.706∗∗∗ 1.717∗∗∗ 1.716∗∗∗
(0.614) (0.566) (0.532) (0.321) (0.315) (0.319)
Gas*Peak 0.286 0.693∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.120)
Gas*Low -0.535∗∗∗ -0.540∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.0859)
Gas*High 0.203 0.232
(0.137) (0.120)
Coal*Peak* 0.114 -0.199
(0.372) (0.288)
Coal*Low 0.391 0.411∗
(0.237) (0.200)
Coal*High -0.412 -0.438
(0.327) (0.275)
EUA*Peak -0.0454 0.234∗
(0.163) (0.115)
EUA*Low -0.126 -0.125
(0.105) (0.0869)
EUA*High 0.223 0.229
(0.141) (0.122)
Peak 6.505∗
(2.870)
Low -1.791
(1.791)
High 10.84∗∗∗
(2.578)
Constant 3.016 4.422 6.991∗ 4.341 11.07∗ 12.41∗∗
(2.878) (2.821) (2.981) (4.843) (4.655) (4.744)
Observations 35064 35064 35064 35064 35064 35064
Note: N=35,064. Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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